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NOTE
A Wrong Still in Search of a Remedy:
Educational Adequacy After Sheff v. O'Neill
Tom Beimers*
In 1989, fourth-grader Milo Sheff and seventeen other
schoolchildren sued the state of Connecticut to eradicate the
segregated conditions in Hartford public schools.' Although
Connecticut had not intentionally segregated racial and ethnic
minorities in Hartford schools, 2 a state statute provided for district boundaries coterminous with city boundaries, 3 leaving
fourteen of Hartford's twenty-five elementary schools with a
white-student enrollment of less than two percent.4 The Con* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1991,
Macalester College.
1 See Sheff v. ONeill, 678 A-2d 1267, 1271 (Conn. 1996). The plaintiffs
filed a four-count complaint alleging that racial and socioeconomic isolation
burdened the students with "severe educational disadvantages." Id. Specifically, the first two counts of the complaint alleged that by implementing and
maintaining "racial and ethnic segregation between Hartford and the surrounding suburban public school districts," the state failed its constitutional
obligation to provide students with "an equal opportunity to a free public education." Id. The third count alleged that because the Hartford students were
"severely educationally disadvantaged" by comparison to the surrounding
schools, the state had failed "to provide a minimally adequate education for
Hartford schoolchildren." Id. at 1271-72. The court did not address the merits of this count, finding that "the plaintiffs' remedial claims did not depend
upon the validity" of that claim. Id. at 1286. For a detailed discussion of the
court's decision, see infra notes 126-138 and accompanying text.
Z See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1274. Except for an incident in the mid-18O0s,
the court found that there was no evidence that the state of Connecticut ever
condoned de jure segregation. See id.
3. The plaintiffs specifically challenged statutes that established the
borders of school districts to coincide with municipal borders and required all
children to attend school within the district where they lived. See id. at 127778.
4. See id. at 1273. The parties stipulated that while minority groups accounted for 25.7% of the statewide student population, 92.4% of the students
in the Hartford public school system were black or Latino. See id. at 1272-73.
Within this population, a majority of the children came from economically dis-
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necticut Supreme Court found that the state, through its districting statute, was "the single most important factor contributing to" the segregated conditions in Hartford's public
schools,5 in spite of affirmative attempts to combat racism in the
schools.' The court accepted the findings of the trial court,
however, that "poverty, and not race or ethnicity, is the principal
causal factor in the lower educational achievement of Hartford
students."' Nonetheless, the court determined that the existence
of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system
deprived schoolchildren of a substantially equal educational
opportunity and required the state to take further remedial
measures.' It declined to specify the necessary relief, however,
instead leaving such a determination to the state legislature.9
Sheff v. O'Neill is a landmark desegregation case. The
stark residential and educational segregation experienced by
Hartford schoolchildren reveals the shortcomings of federal desegregation efforts,10 while the Connecticut Supreme Court's
judicial response indicates the potential scope of stateconstitutional education guarantees."
Though courts have
held state actors liable for school segregation where underlying
residential segregation reflects discriminatory public sentiment, 2
advantaged homes headed by a single parent where English was a second language. See id. at 1273. The court found that these socioeconomic factors impaired the children's attitude toward learning and adversely affected scores
on standardized tests. See id.
5. Id. at 1274. The court found the state to be the "single most important factor" despite the trial court's finding that personal geographic preferences had contributed to the racial imbalances present in the Hartford
schools. See id. at 1278 n.24.
6. The court noted that the state had undertaken various civil rights
initiatives beginning in 1905, and that during the 1980s, the state board of
education reorganized in an effort to more adequately respond to the needs of
urban schoolchildren. See id. at 1274. The strong correlation between residential and educational segregation impedes, however, such efforts. See infra
notes 26-42 and accompanying text (discussing how racial segregation concentrates poverty and precludes educational achievement).
7. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1274.
8. See id. at 1290-91. The court noted that the absence of a constitutional remedy for poverty should not preclude relief for racial and ethnic segregation. See id. at 1287-88.
9. See id. at 1290. The court also failed to specify a timeline, instead directing "the legislature and the executive branch to put the search for appropriate remedial measures at the top of their respective agendas." Id.
10. See infra part I.B (providing an overview of federal desegregation efforts).
11. See infra part IC (discussing litigation predicated on state-constitutional
guarantees of public education).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276,

1997]

EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY

and though some school districts have successfully employed
housing remedies in response to school desegregation orders, 3
no court has explicitly recognized that the interrelated and
reinforcing nature of residential and educational segregation
require housing remedies, irrespective of invidious discriminatory
intent. 4 The continuing failure to realize the promise of Brown
v. Board of Education15 in Northern cities like Hartford made
Sheff an appropriate case in which to develop a broader remedial
framework. Yet while the Sheff court resurrected the profound
but nearly abandoned insight of Brown that racially segregated
schools are "inherently unequal,"16 its reasoning failed to compel
7
remedial solutions capable of realizing the goals of integration.
This Note offers an alternative line of reasoning, predicated on existing housing and education law, that would mitigate negative remedial and precedential implications of the
Sheff decision. It contends that state-constitutional Education
Clauses independently mandate educational adequacy, and by
extension, integration, thus necessitating wide-ranging remedial action. Part I discusses the history of desegregation law,
emphasizing that poverty, race, and educational segregation
intersect to isolate minority communities from opportunity
structures. Part I also outlines the state-constitutional basis
1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that through control of the local school board
and discriminatory housing practices, the city had intentionally fostered the
creation of highly segregated schools).
13. See infra note 38 (noting that successful remedial programs alter perceptions concerning school quality).
14. See john a. powell, Living and Learning:Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L. REV. 749, 766 n.67 (1996) ("I do not know of any case where
courts have looked at housing segregation by first looking at the
['unintentional' segregation of] schools.").
The Yonkers holding of
"intentional" segregation, for instance, required 125 depositions and a 625page opinion to connect racist sentiment with correspondingly acquiescent
policies. See Michael H. Sussman, Discrimination:A Unitary Concept, 80
MINN. L. REV. 875, 888 (chronicling the discovery process in Yonkers, 624 F.
Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. Id. at 495.
17. The term "integration" carries a connotation very different from
"desegregation." "Integration" connotes transformation of racial hierarchy by
exposing members of the dominant culture to different perspectives.
"Desegregation" suggests a right subject to constraints, rather than a benefit
to the entire community. See powell, supra note 14, at 782-85 (citing DAVID
THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 219-20 (1993)); cf. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundariesof Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1913-15
(1994) (offering similar distinction between "cultural desegregation" and
"classic integration").
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for educational adequacy suits. Part II examines the utility of
existing approaches, including fair-share housing suits, for
achieving long-term racial integration. Part H also discusses
the legal and remedial ramifications of the Sheff court's reasoning. It argues that construing the fundamental right to an
education to confer a correlative right to an abstract "equal
educational opportunity" permits too much legislative discretion and undermines the holding's precedential value. Part Ill
offers an alternative line of reasoning that identifies integration
as a precondition of educational adequacy, thereby compelling
housing remedies as an antidote to pervasive segregation.
I. THE CONTEXT OF SHEFFV. O'NEILL:
HYPERSEGREGATION, THE FEDERAL INTENT
STANDARD, AND THE THEORY OF ADEQUACY
In the past fifteen years, the overall trend in housing and
education has been toward an incremental desegregation. 8 In
the urban North, however, the trend has been away from integration, and toward increased segregation on the basis of race
and socioeconomic status. 19 The strong correlation between
18. See James S. Liebman, DesegregatingPolitics: "All-Out"Schools De-

segregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1467-68 (1990) (providing

statistical evidence of increasing integration in some regions); Steven G.
Rivkin, Residential Segregation and School Integration, 67 SOC. OF EDUC.
279, 281 (1994) (providing statistics indicating increased integration in most
regions of the country).

19. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCYA. DENTON, AMERICANAPARTHEiD:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 222 (1993) (noting that

in 1990, more than 75% of blacks in urban northern areas would have to move
to different neighborhoods in order to achieve even distribution throughout
the metropolitan area). Residential segregation among blacks in major American
cities, as measured by the redistribution that would need to occur in order for
each neighborhood to replicate the racial composition of an entire city, increased steadily from relative integration at the turn of the century to
"hypersegregation," or extreme isolation, by 1980. See Nancy A. Denton, The
Persistenceof Segregation:Links Between Residential Segregationand School
Segregation,80 MINN. L. REv. 795, 798 (1996) (defining "hypersegregation" as
a high degree of segregation along any four of the following five dimensions:
uneven distribution across neighborhoods; high isolation within racially homogenous neighborhoods; clustered neighborhoods forming contiguous ghettos;
centralization away from suburban communities and opportunity structures;
and relative population and geographic density).
Segregation resulted in part from the large influx of blacks into northern
cities from the rural South and the subsequent exodus of middle-income
whites, who were attracted by low density, cheap home mortgages, and low
tax rates. See DAVID Rus,

CITIES WITHoUT SUBURBS 5-8 (2nd ed. 1995)

(describing the transformation of urban populations); John Charles Boger,
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spatial isolation and school quality has inevitably led to a resurgence of litigation attacking disparities in educational
quality between urban and suburban schools.2 While the Supreme Court's refusal in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 1 to recognize a fundamental right to education?' foreclosed challenges to property tax-based financing
systems on equal protection grounds, 3 state constitutions have
provided alternative bases for bringing suit.24 State court attempts to redress educational disparities continue to ignore,
however, the crucial role that racial
segregation plays in pro25
ducing and maintaining poverty.
Race and the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect-An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1298 (1993) [hereinafter Boger, Race and the
American City] (noting that while 70% of America's metropolitan population
resided in central cities in 1950, by 1990 that number had fallen to 40%). The
equation of "good" schools and "good" neighborhoods with "white" schools and
"white" neighborhoods also contributed to "white flight." See ANTHONY
DOWNS, NEW VISIONs FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 29 (1994); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation,143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659,
1661 (1995) ("For whites, residential segregation is one of the forces giving
race a 'natural' appearance: 'good' neighborhoods are equated with whiteness,
and 'black neighborhoods are equated with joblessness.").
20. See William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its
Remedies, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 481 (1995) (providing a social context for
adequacy suits).
21. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
22. See id. at 54-55.
23. Rodriguez did not foreclose the possibility of a right to some minimal
level of educational adequacy under the Federal Constitution. See id. at 37
(suggesting that a system that completely shuts out some children may violate
the Equal Protection Clause); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:
Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 131, 131 (1995) (stating that the
right to a minimally adequate education remains an open question under
Rodriguez). Nonetheless, the majority Justices in Rodriguez made it clear
they were unlikely to revisit the question. See 411 U.S. at 59 (stating that
"the ultimate solutions... must come from the lawmakers and ... those who
elect them").
24- See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text (defining scope of fiscalequity and adequacy suits and outlining structure of state-constitutional education provisions).
25. Because of the strong correlation between residential segregation and
educational segregation, it is difficult to integrate schools in cities where few
whites remain in the school system. See Denton, supra note 19, at 795-96, 801
n.27 (1996) (observing that continuing preeminence of neighborhood school
model of public education coupled with increasingly segregated neighborhood
patterns severely limits the potential for integration of inner-city schools);
Rivkin, supra note 18, at 279 (citing Atlanta, Chicago, New Orleans, Newark,
and Washington, D.C., as cities where less than five percent of the student
population is white). Professor Rivkin has observed that because of changes
in urban populations, racial isolation can only be significantly reduced
through the use of "interdistrict integration programs or changes in housing
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A. THE NEXUS OF RACISM, SEGREGATION, AND POVERTY
PRODUCES INADEQUATE EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR

URBAN BLACKS

Commentators have attributed black poverty in the United
States to residential segregation and isolation from opportunity structures.2 6

According to empirical studies, systematic

patterns." Id. at 285.
26. "Opportunity structures" refer to the panoply of advantages, such as
"work support networks (car pools, informal job information networks), institutions (good schools and training programs), and systems (child care and
transportation) that most of the employed population in this country rely on."
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 51 (1996) [hereinafter
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS]. For a discussion of the various barriers
to opportunities, see id. at 51-86. See also John P. Blair & Rudy H. Fichtenbaum, ChangingBlack Employment Patterns, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK &
WHITE: PLACE, POWER AND POLARIZATION 72 (George C. Galster & Edward K.
Hill eds., 1992) (discussing unemployment rates among blacks and concluding
that blacks are "last hired, first fired" and remain completely barred from
some important occupations); Phillip L. Clay, The (Un)Housed City: Racial
Patterns of Segregation, Housing Quality and Affordability, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK & WHITE, supra at 93-104 (providing statistical evidence to
support the conclusion that blacks are disproportionately burdened by a lack of
affordable housing and a concomitant deprivation of the services and amenities commonly associated with quality housing); Edward W. Hill & Heidi
Marie Rock, Race and Inner-City Education, in THE METROPOLIS IN BLACK &
WHITE, supra at 108, 124 (concluding from statistical survey that the poor
quality of inner-city education is "built on a foundation of racial and class
isolation"); John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A
FairShare Proposalfor the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 157576 (1993) [hereinafter Boger, FairShare] (observing that segregation confines
large numbers of blacks to economically inferior and socially underserved
communities); Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1659 (emphasizing that isolation
from opportunity structures influences the construction of racial stereotypes);
powell, supra note 14, at 758 (noting that residential segregation includes not
only isolation from people of a different race, but also from opportunity structures such as education, health care, and jobs).
The Kerner Commission Report in 1968 predicted that patterns of white
migration to the suburbs would result in serious economic disadvantages for the
urban black population. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS 21-29 (1968). This prediction has proven true, as trends in
job growth have isolated urban minorities from opportunity structures. See
James E. Rosenbaum et al., Can the Kerner Commission's Housing Strategy
Improve Employment, Education, and Social Integration for Low-Income
Blacks?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1520-21 (1993) (citing statistics showing that
large numbers of employers have left the cities for the suburbs). In the education context, this isolation impacts students' self-perception and contributes
to low achievement levels by inculcating in students a sense that they lack
"destiny control." See Boger, Race and the American City, supra note 19, at
1299. In the aggregate, these various forms of social isolation combine to form
what Professor Wilson has termed "concentration effects," in which the lack of
access to job networks, quality schools, and other opportunity structures
places entire urban ecological niches at an enormous social disadvantage. See
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exclusion from integrated neighborhoods and accompanying
socioeconomic advantages does not result from natural forces;
public and private discriminatory practices impose them on urban
blacks.2 7 Neither relative affluence" nor preferences 29 play a
significant role in the continuing residential segregation among
blacks.31 Empirical evidence shows that race is the primary determinant in residential segregation of blacks and a unique
barrier to socioeconomic assimilation. 31 Sociologists have demWILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 58-61 (1987) [hereinafter WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED].

27. Persistent segregation can be explained only by illegal housing discrimination and white bias against integrated neighborhoods. See Boger, Fair
Share, supra note 26, at 1577-78 (citing empirical evidence of both phenomena). Although disagreement exists concerning the extent to which overt racism maintains segregated conditions, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race
and Poverty Intersect to PreventIntegration:DestabilizingRace as a Vehicle to
Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1610 n.49 (1995) (citing
conflicting findings), there can be little question that overt discrimination
produced the entrenched segregation present in urban areas today, see id. at
1612-14 (citing the practice of "redlining" in private and governmental mortgage lending policies as a contributing factor in the creation of the urban
ghetto).
28. See John 0. Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The Necessary & Proper
Aspirationsof FairHousing, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1989, at 94-95,

97 (1989) (noting that levels of segregation among blacks do not correspond
significantly to educational attainment or affluence).
29. Limitations on the ability of blacks to gain access to more affluent
neighborhoods are unrelated to preferences. See Boger, Fair Share, supra
note 26, at 1577 (citing surveys showing that black preferences are for integrated neighborhoods). By contrast, white preferences are for black populations of less than 20%. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 93 (citing
studies of residential preferences). Though support for integrated schools is
more widespread, there remains a significant gap between black and white
preferences. See Larry Tye, Poll Shows Wide Support Across U.S. for Integration,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1992, at 15, cited in powell, supra note 14, at 761 n.44
(reporting a willingness to employ busing to achieve integration in 79% of
blacks and 48% of whites). But see DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW § 7.6.4 n.26 (3rd ed., 1992) (citing surveys showing black disillusionment with desegregation programs requiring busing).
30. See Richard H. Sander, Comment, Individual Rights and DemographicRealities: The Problemof FairHousing, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 874, 885-88
(1988) (citing evidence of persistent segregation despite affluence and preferences for integrated neighborhoods); see also Denton, supra note 19, at 801-05
(discussing "myths" used to explain the persistence of segregation among
blacks). But see DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
AND THE LAW 127-46 (1995) (arguing that a combination of relative impoverishment and preferences explain the high degree of minority segregation).
31. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 85 (suggesting that discrimination is the most significant factor in residential segregation). But see
ARMOR, supra note 30, at 146 (concluding that minority preferences are the
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onstrated that, once in place, residential racial segregation effectively perpetuates socioeconomic deprivation by preserving
significant levels of spatial isolation and absolute poverty.32
Poverty, segregation, and racism intersect to form a
seemingly intractable cycle of social pathologies. Public policy
experts have observed that extreme isolation generates
"concentration effects," 33 including the creation of an
"oppositional culture" characterized by a rejection of middleclass norms for work, speech, education and marriage.3 4 Researchers note that the confluence of high poverty and extreme
isolation produce a climate of hopelessness, causing black cultural values to diverge from white middle-class norms." These
strongest explanatory factor in segregated housing and discrimination the
least significant); cf Johnson, supra note 27, at 1638-39 (arguing that affluence signifies a degree of assimilation in blacks to the dominant culture,
thereby permitting a greater degree of spatial mobility than that identified by
Massey and Denton).
32. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 160-61 (relating high racial
and economic isolation to extreme social isolation, such that many inner city
residents never leave the confines of their neighborhood). In a simulation exercise, Massey and Denton demonstrate how neighborhood conditions for
whites improve and those for blacks deteriorate as a city becomes more segregated by race and class. See id. at 118-25 (explaining "how segregation concentrates poverty"). But see CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980, at 212-16 (1984) (suggesting that social welfare
programs perpetuate poverty).
33. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 26, at 58 (describing
concentration effects resulting from the social transformation of inner cities).
34. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 166-68 (identifying formation of opposition culture as "a common psychological adaptation whenever a
powerless minority group is systematically subordinated by a dominant majority").
As segregation and isolation becomes increasingly entrenched, admonitions to
adhere to white middle class values seem "hollow and pointless." Id. at 170.
But cf. MURRAY, supra note 32, at 221-23 (arguing that intellectual apologies
for negative minority social behaviors exacerbate and encourage these patterns).
35. Massey and Denton point to the participant-observer studies of sociologist Elijah Anderson as a clear illustration of divergence in the attitudes of
urban blacks from those of the white society. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra
note 19, at 172-73 (citing ELIJAH ANDERSON, A PLACE ON THE CORNER (1976)
and ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN

COMMUNITY (1990)). In the first study, carried out in the 1970s, poor blacks

adhered to such traditional values as "hard work, honesty, diligence, respect
for authority, and staying out of trouble." See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
19, at 173. In a second study conducted in the late 1980s, similarly situated
subjects exhibited "scorn and ridicule" for these same values. See id. Other
studies demonstrate that this divergence of values exists in school children as
well. See id. at 168, 179 (citing studies showing that black children "face tremendous pressure from their peers to avoid 'acting white' in succeeding in
school and achieving academic distinction" and that rates of sexual activity
and pregnancy among black teenage girls lower significantly in integrated
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attitudes impact the perceptions of both blacks and whites
36
about the desirability of urban neighborhoods and schools.
Residential segregation affects access to services, including
education. 37 Districting statutes drawn to coextend with
neighborhood boundaries result in racially and economically
segregated educational programs. 38 While educational segresettings). But see MURRAY, supra note 32, at 232-35 (concluding that government programs have impeded achievement among poor minority groups).
36. See powell, supra note 14, at 781 (arguing that "negative perceptions
about urban schools contribute to the unwillingness of white families to move
to urban neighborhoods"). Professor powell notes that the Supreme Court acknowledged the significant impact of perceived school quality on housing
choices. See id. at 755 (citing Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971)). The Court in Swann stated that "[pleople gravitate
toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of
people." 402 U.S. at 20. Some courts and commentators attribute "white
flight" in large part to a desire on the part of whites to avoid mandatory desegregation plans. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2051 (1995)
(noting that desegregation plans affect housing decisions); Gary Orfield, MetropolitanSchool Desegregation:Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 825, 866 (1996) (discussing studies linking declining white enrollments
to desegregation plans).
37. Even where only a small percentage of residents live in poverty, a
high proportion of minority students attend schools experiencing conditions
associated with concentrated poverty. See Orfield, supra note 36, at 860-61
(stating that schools with black and Latino populations of higher than 90% are
14 times more likely than white schools to have a majority impoverished student population). Because a school's percentage of poor children "is an extremely strong predictor of inequality in educational outcomes," id. at 861,
and because residential and educational segregation are "inextricably intertwined," Denton, supra note 19, at 795, it follows that combinations of racial
isolation and concentrated poverty will inhibit educational achievement. See
also MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 141-42 (relating the intersection of
poverty and various levels of racial segregation to performance on standardized tests); powell, supra note 14, at 764-65 (noting that attending racially and
socioeconomically segregated schools impairs life chances and choices).
Empirical studies support these propositions. In a study of employer attitudes, sociologists found that employers equate black inner-city residency
with "poor, uneducated, unskilled, lacking in values, crime, gangs, drugs, and
unstable families" and made hiring decisions in accordance with these perceptions. Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, 'We'd Love to Hire
Them, But ... ": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 215-17 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E.Peterson eds., 1991).
38. Some courts have ordered the merger of urban and suburban school
districts as part of desegregation programs. See Orfield, supra note 36, at
869-70 (discussing these kinds of court orders). Combining "the destiny
of... metropolitan areas and their school districts" alters suburban perceptions concerning the needs of urban schools. Id. at 871-72; cf id.at 868-69
(noting that districts which have employed housing remedies in response to
desegregation orders, including successful housing programs in Louisville,
Denver, and Chicago, have altered the perception of children and parents concerning the benefits of education).
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gation serves as an unique impediment to black academic
achievement,39 integration appears to enhance academic performance in both black4 ° and white4" student populations. The
absence of nonminority populations in urban school systems
and continuing resistance to busing programs, however, limits
the opportunity for achieving integrated education.4 2

39. See WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 26, at 57-58
(observing that fewer than 10% of black and Latino students in segregated
Chicago schools can read at the level of the national average upon graduation); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 26, at 1532-37 (noting that inner-city
blacks attending suburban Chicago schools achieved at a higher rate than
similarly situated students attending segregated inner-city schools).
40. See RUSK, supra note 19, at 123 (citing a study of Albuquerque public
schools showing a strong positive correlation between test scores of public
housing students and the percentage of middle-class students in the school);
CHRISTINE ROSSELL & WILLIS HAWLEY, THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 116-19 (1983) (citing 13 studies in which IQ scores of minority
students increased dramatically as a result of busing programs that permitted
school attendance in more affluent areas). Disparities in academic achievement between black and white students persist irrespective of equality in perstudent spending. For example, despite the designation of several resegregated Norfolk, Virginia schools as "target" schools that would receive funding
beyond that allocated to white schools, gaps in achievement between students
in target and non-target schools widened significantly over a five year period.
See CHRISTINA MELDRUM & SUSAN E. EATON, RESEGREGATION IN NORFOLK,
VIRGINIA: DOES RESTORING NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS WORK? 44 (Harvard
Project on School Desegregation ed., 1994). Prior to resegregation, these same
black students' scores on the Iowa Basics test improved by 20 percentage
points during the three year desegregation and busing plan. See id. at 48; cf
Rosenbaum et al., supra note 26, at 1525 (offering explanations for instances
where desegregation does not have positive effects on black students).
41. White students in some programs have performed better after desegregation. See MELDRUM & EATON, supra note 40, at 48. Moreover, there is
virtually no evidence that desegregation damages white academic performance. See Vivian W. Ikpa, The Effects of Changes in School Characteristics
Resulting from the Eliminationof the Policy of Mandated Busing for Integration upon the Academic Achievement of African-American Students, 17 ED.
RESEARCH Q. 19, 22 (1993) (discussing effect of desegregation programs on
academic achievement); see also Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M.
McPartland, The Social and Academic Consequences of School Desegregation,
EQUITY AND CHOICE, Feb. 1988, at 6-7 (discussing the relationship between
desegregation and academic achievement); cf Sherry, supra note 23, at 169
(noting correlation between black achievement on intelligence tests and
proximity to white middle-class values).
42. Negative perceptions impede the potential efficacy of busing as a
remedy for educational segregation. See Braddock & McPartland, supra note
41, at 5 (comparing polls showing 20% of whites and 60% of blacks favoring
busing with polls showing 90% of both races favoring integrated schools); Orfield, supra note 36, at 866 (discussing studies that link antibusing sentiment
to "white flight" by positing that "implementing busing plans accelerated the
loss of white students from school districts); powell, supra note 14, at 779

1997]
B.

EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY

FEDERAL LAW'S FAILED ATrEMPTs TO DESEGREGATE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS

4 3 the United States Supreme Court
In Plessy v. Ferguson,
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not forbid separate but equal railroad accommodations for blacks and whites." The Court determined that
the Constitution could not enforce "social, as distinguished
from political equality."4 5 Half a century later, in Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown 1),46 the Supreme Court reexamined the "separate but equal" doctrine and determined that
separate educational facilities were inherently unequal.4 7 The
Court rejected the distinction between social and political
equality, holding that comparable facilities failed to provide
equal education opportunities for white and black schoolchildren.4 8
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I),149 the Court
stated that school boards must desegregate school systems
"with all deliberate speed."50 Given little guidance, however,
the lower courts were unable to overcome school closings, legislative resistance, vouchers enabling white parents to send their
children to private schools, and simple inaction on the part of

(commenting that "mandatory busing is perceived as the antithesis of
strengthening communities, rather than as an effective step toward achieving
integration"); infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text (arguing that effective integration policies must inculcate a sense of community). But see BELL,
supra note 29, at § 7.6.4 n.24 (observing that in cost-benefit terms, busing
should be an effective remedy); Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of StateConstitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheff v. O'Neill?, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 351, 402 (1996) (noting that "white flight" may occur as an immediate response to desegregation, but is not permanent).
43. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
44. See id. at 544.
45. Id.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See id. at 495.
48. See id. at 494 (explaining that separate school systems impede the
educational and mental development of black children since separation of the
races is perceived as denoting the inferiority of the black race). Recent surveys
of attitudes reinforce the Brown I Court's reliance on the stigmatizing effect of
segregation as a factor weighing against the constitutionality of "separate but
equal." See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 31 (1991) (inferring from black children's choice of integrated schools over better schools that the children recognize the difference
between segregation and subordination).
49. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
50. Id. at 301.
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school districts." Although the Supreme Court repeatedly expressed impatience with the deliberate pace of desegregation
programs, 5 2 it was not until Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education53 that the Court provided specific guide54
lines for removing the vestiges of segregated school systems.
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 55 the Court concluded
that segregative intent was sufficient to establish de jure segregation despite the presence of an "allegedly logical, racially
neutral" policy supporting segregated schools. 6 One year
later, however, the Court determined that the presence of de
jure segregation in one school district did not automatically
warrant an interdistrict remedy. Invoking the tradition of local
control over the operation of schools, the Court in Milliken v.
Bradley rejected the argument that busing programs could
cross district lines without a showing of de jure segregation in

51. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
14.9 (4th ed. 1991); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 232-71
(1994) (discussing state resistance to the Brown decisions); Liebman, supra
note 18, at 1574-75 (noting that "vague" guidance provided by early decisions
may have exacerbated resistance).
52. See Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970) (per
curium) (reversing a lower court decision allowing a one-semester delay in the
implementation of a desegregation order); Green v. School Bd. of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (emphasizing the need for remedial plans
"realistically to work now"); Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County,
377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (stating that the "time for mere 'deliberate speed'
ha[d] run out"); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (invalidating a
component of desegregation plan that permitted children to transfer schools
in order to obtain majority status).
53. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
54. See id. at 22-31 (enumerating racial balancing, majority-to-minority
transfers, alteration of attendance zones, and transportation of students as
permissible remedial measures in cases of de jure segregation).
55. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
56. Id. at 210. The Court emphasized that the distinguishing characteristic between de jure and de facto segregation was one of intent. See id. at
208.
57. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (stating that an interdistrict remedy is warranted if there has been an interdistrict violation).
The Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), impacted the analytical framework for future desegregation
cases. In declining to grant public education the status of fundamental right,
the Court established rational-basis scrutiny as the appropriate level of
analysis in responding to claims of educational discrepancy. See id. at 40.
Under state constitutions, by contrast, any infringement on the fundamental
right to an education is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., infra note
130 (noting the distinction between education under Connecticut and federal
constitutional law).
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each affected district. 8 While upholding the constitutional
right of blacks in Detroit to attend a "unitary" school system in
that district, 9 the Court drew a rigid boundary between school
districts for remedial purposes. 0 Reliance by the Supreme
Court on the concept of a unitary school system presupposes
that federal supervision is a temporary measure designed to
return control to local officials as soon as the school system is
in compliance with the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause."
The Court in Freeman v. Pitts62 relied on this distinction
between unitary status and integration to hold that once "any
current imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the
6
prior violation," there is no longer any constitutional violation. 1
The Court attributed resegregation not to any state action, but
to market forces outside the scope of judicial control.'
The

58. See 418 U.S. at 741-45.
59. See id. at 746. The term "unitary" refers to the Brown I requirement
that the dual system erected under the "separate but equal" doctrine be fully
eradicated. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6
(1971) (defining the goal of unitary status); Sussman, supra note 14, at 893-94
(criticizing the use of the "unitary" concept in federal desegregation cases).
60. See 418 U.S. at 741-43. In so doing, the Court rejected the trial
courts conclusion that the state should be held vicariously responsible for the
Detroit school district's unconstitutional policies, thereby permitting interdistrict remedies. See id. at 735-36. Justice White, in dissent, noted that "the
only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines."
Id. at 766 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215,
249 (6th Cir. 1973)). Justice White also noted that political subdivisions may
be required to reconfigure boundaries in response to constitutional violations.
See id. at 777 (citing reapportionment cases); see also supra note 25
(discussing remedial implications of hypersegregation).
6L See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246-50 (1991). The factors
used in determining whether discrimination persists, however, are currently
assessed in a superficial manner. See Sussman, supra note 14, at 893
(discussing the factors identified in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430, 435 (1968), to assess whether school boards were conducting themselves
in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause). As Part L.A demonstrates,
however, racial discrimination comprises a far more complex set of motivations
and interactions than that supposed by the Supreme Court's narrow inquiry
into the good faith of a school district's official stance.
62. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
63. Id. at 494.
64. See id. at 494-95. Similarly, Justice Stewart in Milliken v. Bradley
attributed residential segregation in suburban Detroit to "unknown and perhaps unknowable factors." 418 U.S. 717, 756 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). One of the difficulties with the "unitary" perspective is that it leads to
confusion regarding the ultimate objective of school desegregation decrees. In
Freeman, Justice Kennedy suggests that the ultimate purpose of desegrega-
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Court, in Missouri v. Jenkins,65 extended this logic to a plan to
integrate schools by attempting to reverse "white flight."6 6 The
Court rejected the plan because violations had only occurred
within the district. 61 While the Supreme Court's desegregation
jurisprudence has thus narrowly circumscribed the situations
permitting remedial action,6 8 state courts continue to adhere to
the Brown dictum that "[i]t is crucial for a democratic society to
provide all of its schoolchildren with fair access to an unsegre69
gated education."
C.

EDUCATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: EDUCATION REFORM
THROUGH MINIMUM STANDARDS OF EFFECTIVENESS

The constitution of every state contains some kind of an
education provision. 0 Although the location and specific lantion decrees is the return of school districts to local control, see 503 U.S. at
489-90, whereas a historical analysis suggests that the purpose of desegregation orders was to extirpate racial segregation, see Sussman, supra note 14, at
894.
65. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
66. See id. at 96.
67. See id. at 92. The Court ruled that the employment of magnet schools
to attract white students back to the city fell outside the permissible remedial
scope where no intent to discriminate was shown. See id.
68. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 767 (White, J., dissenting) (noting the Court
of Appeals' observation in Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir.
1973), that failure to provide a remedy for severely isolated schools surrounded "by suburban school systems overwhelmingly white" conjured
"haunting memories... of Plessy v. Ferguson") (alterations in original)
(citations omitted); Liebman, supra note 18, at 1471 n.51) ("The reappearance
of proto-'separate but equal' views among members of the federal judiciary, of
a sort not publicly expressed from that quarter for decades, indicates the current legal fragility of school desegregation.").
69. Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996). Cf Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989) (noting the
"immeasurable worth of education to our state and its citizens"). See generally powell, supra note 14, at 782-85 (arguing that the harms identified in
Brown I require an approach to education that focuses on transformation
through interaction between the dominant group and the minority groups).
70. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256, amend. 111 (authorizing a public
school system); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (providing that "the Legislature shall
encourage ...the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural
improvement); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (providing that "there shall always
be free public elementary and secondary schools in th[is] state"); GA. CONsT.
art. VIII, § 1, T 1 (requiring "adequate" public schools); MASS. CONST. pt. 2,
ch. 5, § 2 (providing detailed guidelines for the legislature, including the duty
to "cherish" education); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ("thorough and efficient");
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1 ("thorough and efficient"); N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI,
§ 1 (requiring a system of free public schools); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(providing for the "establishment and maintenance of a system of public
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guage varies from document to document,71 these provisions
provide a textual basis for claims implicating the state's duty
to provide an education. 2 Despite difficulties surrounding interpretation of education clauses, state courts have read these
provisions to demand improvements in their educational system. 3
In the landmark case of Robinson v. Cahill,7 4 for example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated the state's property-tax
based school finance system as failing to satisfy constitutionally
mandated standards of educational opportunity.Y While similar
schools"). For a complete list, see Richard J. Stark, EducationReform: Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance ProvisionsAdequacy vs. Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 627-28 n-90 (defining an
"education provision" as any segment of a state's constitution enabling or
mandating the creation and maintenance of a school system).
71. The education provisions of the Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming constitutions
all require that the schools be "uniform," "thorough," "efficient," "adequate,"
"sufficient," or some combination thereof. See Stark, supra note 70, at 628 &
n.92. The constitutions of California and Iowa require their respective legislative bodies to "encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement." CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1;
IOWA CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Some provisions mandate a free system of education without further qualification. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); NEB.
CONST. art. VII, § 1. Others merely authorize the creation of a public school
system. See, e.g., MIss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201.
72. See, e.g., Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1280 ("No statute, no common law precedent, no federal constitutional principle provides this state's schoolchildren
with a right to a public education that is not burdened by de facto racial and
ethnic segregation. The plaintiffs make no such claim....

The issue ... is

whether [plaintiffs] have stated a case for relief under our state constitution

73. Justice Brennan's seminal 1977 article may have spurred state court
vindication of education rights claims. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand
Authority in State Constitutionalism,106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1150-53 (1993)
(citing William J.Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival
of State Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
535, 546 (1986), as influencing state courts' willingness to liberally construe
constitutional rights). The constitutional basis for adequacy arguments permits courts to take the lead in generating reform. See Phil Weiser, What's
Quality Got to Do with It?: ConstitutionalTheory, Politics, and Education Reform, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 745, 751 (1994-1995) (arguing that to
"effectuate meaningful educational reform, courts must (1) force a new consideration of the state's education[all problems, (2) create a sense of urgency
and crisis, and (3) provide legislators with political protection, or 'cover,' for
enacting comprehensive reform").
74. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
75. In emphasizing that the funding scheme resulted in unequal allocation of education dollars, the Robinson court relied exclusively on the state
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fiscal equity arguments met with early success in several
states,76 equalized
financing alone failed to redress educational
77
deficiencies.

In recent years, litigants have shifted the focus away from

funding equity and toward issues of the substantive quality of
educational opportunities provided by the state.78 These legal
theories of educational opportunity find their basis in the standards of adequacy implicit in the education clauses of state
constitutions.7 9 Adequacy theories argue that education clauses
constitution's education clause, which requires a "thorough and efficient" education. See id. at 294 (citing N.J. CONST., Art. VII, § 4, 2).
76. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (1977) (holding that
disparities resulting from the state's school financing scheme offended plaintiffs fundamental right to an equal educational opportunity). But see Skeen v.
State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (ruling that the state's financing system satisfied the "baseline level of adequacy and uniformity" contemplated by
the constitutionally mandated duty to create a general and uniform system of
education). Finance equity theories developed largely in response to the variability in per-pupil spending resulting from the local tax revenue component
of school financing schemes. While state and federal allocations can designate
a fixed per-pupil amount, local revenue varies according to the financial
strength of the tax base. See Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Disorder in the Courts:The Aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez in the State Courts, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 554 (1996)
(explaining the basis of "fiscal equity" theories).
77. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 77-83 (1995) (quoting Jenkins v.
Misouri, 19 F.3d 393, 403 (8th Cir. 1994), which stated that student achievement in the Kansas City district remained below national norms despite a
school system "that offers more educational opportunity than anywhere in
America"); Sherry, supra note 23, at 183-84 (arguing that differences in
achievement are not a function of "easily measurable (and easily, if expensively remediable) differences between schools"); see also notes 40-42 and accompanying text (suggesting that integration strategies are more effective
than monetary strategies). But see Martha L. Minow, School Finance:Does
Money Matter?, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 398-99 (1991) (contending that resource allocation remains a strong predictor of outcomes).
78. Claims based on "legal adequacy" theories assert that "some students
are not receiving adequate educations as measured by state-defined or other
contemporary education standards." Paul Minorini, Recent Developments in
School Finance Equity and Educational Adequacy Cases, ERS SPECTRUM,
Winter 1994, 3 at 3. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 108-9 (1995) (defining
adequacy arguments as those which evaluate the capacity of educational
services to meet constitutional obligations, as opposed to equity-based arguments, which focus on quantitative differences in available resources); infra
notes 185-201 and accompanying text (identifying the prerequisites for and
components of an adequate education). Despite the contrast with equity suits,
see supra note 76, "the two theories are not always clearly distinguishable in
practice." Clune, supra note 20, at 481 (discussing generally adequacy suits).
79. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text (discussing education
clauses); infra notes 80-91, 136-138 and accompanying text (providing an
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impose an affirmative obligation on the state to identify and
implement substantive capacities comprising a minimum
standard of education." Increasing emphasis in lawsuits on
the obligations imposed by state education clauses has yielded
substantive standards that resonate with the Brown I Court's
admonition to treat education as "perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.""
For example, in Rose v. Councilfor BetterEducation,Inc.,8 2 the
Kentucky Supreme Court set forth guidelines outlining "a vision
of an educational system consistent with the state's commitment to education."8 3 The Kentucky court interpreted the
state's commitment to education, embodied in the constitutional provision for "an efficient system of common schools,"8
to mandate "equal educational opportunity"85 with regard to
specific substantive educational capacities. 86 Noting that the
sole responsibility for executing this constitutional directive
lies with the legislative branch, the court stated that any deleoverview of the basis for and reasoning in adequacy suits).
80. See Stark, supra note 70, at 627 (providing selected interpretations of
education clauses); infra note 86 (giving one such interpretation).
81. Brown I, 374 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This quotation is cited in several
adequacy suits. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 158 (Ala.
1993); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 151 (Tenn.
1993).
82. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
83. Id. at 212-213. See generally Weiser, supra note 73, at 768-72
(describing the Kentucky case).
84. KY. CONST. § 183.
85. 790 S.W.2d at 212. Paul Kahn has noted that equality and efficiency
are usually thought of as antithetical and suggests that notions of fairness
explain these decisions. See Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalismand the
Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 466-67 (1996) (discussing the
decision in Rose).
86. See 790 S.W.2d at 212. The court defined the fundamental right to
educational adequacy to include seven capacities as minimum requirements:
oral and written communications skills; sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to permit informed choices; understanding of governmental processes sufficient to understand issues affecting community,
state, and nation; self-knowledge, including health and wellness; ability to appreciate cultural and historical heritage; sufficient training to be able to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and "sufficient levels of academic or
vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with
their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market."
See id. The court ruled that this constitutional right to an adequate education
was contemplated by the constitutional mandate of common schools. See id.
at 213. The court also directed the General Assembly to provide funding sufficient to meet these requirements. See id; cf. McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554-55 (Mass. 1993) (interpreting its education clause to require the same seven substantive standards).
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gation of decision making authority to local boards must comport
with constitutional requirements. 7
Similarly, an Alabama Circuit Court found that Alabama's
education system offered neither equal nor adequate opportunities to the state's schoolchildren. 8 The court issued a remedial
order outlining the reforms necessary to meet constitutional
and statutory requirements. 9 The order contained a set of performance standards aimed at ensuring the students' capacity
to compete in the regional and national job market. 90 In its

87. See 790 S.W.2d at 216. Commentators have noted that the court
sought to legitimate its decision on the basis of civic pride and common identity. See Weiser, supra note 73, at 760 (noting that the public and the legislature responded positively to the challenge). Other commentators also suggest
that courts can play an instrumental role in shaping public agendas by
grounding decisions in constitutionally protected public commitments. See,
e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 131-33 (1991). This theory of constitutional interpretation supports expansive readings of education clauses. See
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (Wash. 1978) ("We must interpret the constitution in accordance with the demands of modem society or
it will be in constant danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, may even lose
its original meaning."); cf Ellen A. Peters, State ConstitutionalLaw: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 586 (1986) (book
review) (author of Sheff majority opinion noting that constitutional interpretation must conform to changing context and circumstances).
88. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107, 110-11 (Ala. 1993). Opinion of the Justices includes an advisory opinion from the Alabama Supreme
Court confirming the constitutionality of the Circuit Court of Montgomery
County's decision in which it exhaustively explored the state's education system and held it unconstitutional on both adequacy and fiscal equity grounds.
The lower court's order in the consolidated cases of Alabama Coalition for
Equity, Inc. v. Hunt and Harperv. Hunt is included as an appendix to the advisory opinion. See id. at 110.
89. The Alabama constitution requires the state to "establish, organize,
and maintain a liberal system of public schools." ALA. CONST. art. )UV, § 256,
amend. II. The circuit court ruled that the section must "be liberally construed, with the view of effectuating the intention of its framers." 624 So.2d
at 146. The court construed the term "liberal" to require a minimally adequate education, terming this "the only kind of system that conforms with a
liberal reading of the constitutional text." Id. at 154. The order required that
the state establish a foundational level of support to ensure that the special
needs of economically and otherwise disadvantaged students would be met.
See id. at 144-46.
90. See id. at 155. In a speech to the constitutional framers, the Superintendent of Education admonished that "[tihe only way to make Alabama able
to support a public school system is to educate her people and they will become prosperous. This will have to come first, poverty or no poverty. There is
not an example to the contrary in the history of mankind." See id. Similarly,
the court in Sheff noted that the future economic strength of the entire state
and its economy depended on its response to the plight of the urban poor. See
678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn. 1996).
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advisory opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the order, stating that the circuit court fulfilled its duty to interpret
the constitution and requiring the legislature to follow its order. 1
1I. ANALYZING REMEDIAL STRATEGIES FOR
AMELIORATING THE HARMS OF RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION AND THE SHEFFCOURT'S RESPONSE
TO SEVERE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC ISOLATION
Previous attempts to address the interrelated problems of
educational and residential segregation have inevitably focused on one to the detriment, and often exclusion, of the other.
This omission results in large part from a failure to recognize
that the socioeconomic realities attendant to racial isolation
constrain choices and often undermine remedial efforts. While
no state or federal case has attempted to address residential
segregation as a precondition to meaningful educational segregation, several existing decisions provide useful illustrations of
potential legal bases for developing remedial solutions for educational and residential isolation. These cases demonstrate
that state constitutions provide a basis for ordering fair-share
housing remedies and suggest that race-conscious housing
strategies contribute significantly to achieving meaningful
educational opportunities. Although Sheff provided a unique
opportunity for combining insights regarding the interconnectedness of residential and educational isolation with stateconstitutionally based analytical framework for compelling
wide-ranging remedial solutions, the court ultimately failed to
recognize that the link between race and poverty is inextricable
for remedial purposes. As a result, the court failed to provide a
remedial framework that encompasses both residential and
educational integration, and instead deferred to legislative
judgment regarding relief.

A. THE STATE-CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF FAIR-SHARE
HOUSING

In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel (Mt. Laurel ),92 a plaintiffs group representing poor
black and Hispanic residents9 3 challenged municipal zoning

91.
92.
93.
See idi

See Opinionof the Justices,624 So. 2d at 110.
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
The plaintiffs included current, past, and future residents of Mt. Laurel.
at 717.
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ordinances that restricted the plaintiffs' ability to obtain
housing. 94 Plaintiffs offered evidence demonstrating that "[t]he
general ordinance requirements ... realistically allow only
homes within
the financial reach of persons of at least middle
95
income."
Mt. Laurel conceded that its zoning ordinance operated to exclude low- and middle-income housing but justified its policy by
reference to the "fiscal interest of the municipality and its inhabitants."96 The New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the
zoning ordinance finding, the general welfare clause 97 of the
state constitution imposed on municipalities an affirmative obligation to consider regional welfare when implementing their
planning authority.98 The court required each municipality to
meet its "fair share" of the regional housing needs by zoning so as to
provide realistic opportunities for the creation of low-cost housing.99
94. See id. The social and historical context of this litigation is a microcosm of the sea change in residential living patterns that occurred throughout
the United States in the post-World War II era. See supra note 19. In the
decade from 1950 to 1960, the population of Mt. Laurel, an outer-ring suburb
of Camden, nearly doubled. 336 A.2d at 718. The land use regulations in Mt.
Laurel exemplified suburban attempts to stem growth through exclusionary
zoning. See id. at 719-22. Though municipal zoning, at least initially, was intended to counteract "urban congestion and untrammeled growth," DAVID L.
CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 2 (2d ed. 1994), communities began in the 1950s to employ "exclusionary zoning" to prevent the construction of housing affordable to low-income residents, see id. at 432
(defining "exclusionary zoning" as the practice of establishing minimum lot
sizes, bedroom restrictions, or other mechanisms designed to ensure the
maintenance of a high socioeconomic status in a particular community); see
also NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,
H.R. Doc. No. 91-34 (1st Sess. 1969) (noting that suburban communities
throughout the U.S. adopted exclusionary policies); NAOMI BAILIN WISH &
STEPHEN EISDORFER, THE IMPACT OF THE MT. LAUREL INITIATIVES: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICANTS AND OCCUPANTS 14 (1996)

(discussing antecedents to fair-share housing litigation).
95. 336 A.2d at 719.
96. Id. at 718. Although the case originally contained claims of racial exclusion, the court accepted the city's contention that the exclusionary policy
was solely motivated by economic interests. See id. at 719.
97. The exercise of a state's police power must promote public health,
safety, morals, or the general welfare. These requirements are inherent in
constitutional provisions for substantive due process and equal protection of
the laws. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)
(ruling that exercise of delegated authority is limited by general welfare considerations); Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725-28 (discussing general welfare requirements).
98. See Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 727-28.
99. See Id. at 731-32. In mandating inclusionary zoning-i.e. the use of
zoning to create realistic housing opportunities-the court recommended
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In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel (Mt. Laurel i),100 the court revisited the issue of "fair
10 1
share" housing in response to widespread non-compliance,
this time articulating specific obligations, providing incentives,
and, to ensure compliance, establishing judicial oversight. 0 2
The court emphasized that the affirmative obligations set forth
in the first decision might require incentives in order to make
housing opportunities "realistic." 3 Rather than relying on "the
inclination of developers to help the poor,""° the court required
municipalities to take affirmative steps to induce development
by augmenting inclusionary zoning measures with incentives
and by providing subsidized set-asides. 10 5 New Jersey's legislameasures such as small lot sizes without minimum square footage restrictions, tying industrial zoning to residential zoning so as to ensure decent
housing for employees, and eliminating bedroom restrictions. See id. at 732.
The court, however, did not provide any means of determining regional housing
requirements, choosing to leave this to city administrators. See id. at 733.
100. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
101 But see G. Alan Tarr & Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity
in State Supreme Court Policymaking: The New Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 556 (1984) (arguing that there is no necessary correlation between the inclusionary zoning mandated in Mt. Laurel I
and availability of low-cost housing).
102. See Mt. LaurelII, 456 A.2d at 442,446-50 & 459.
103. See id. at 442.
104 Id. The court observed it is unrealistic to expect even a developer enthusiastic about assisting the poor to construct less profitable housing merely
because the municipalities alter zoning regulations to permit it. See id.
105. See id. at 443-46. The term "inclusionary zoning" in Mt. Laurel II encompassed not only the requirement to provide realistic housing opportunities
but also specific affirmative techniques for encouraging the construction of
low and moderate-income housing in economically integrated developments.
See Ford, supra note 17, at 1914 (describing the effect of the Mt. Laurel decisions); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary"Zoning, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1167, 1169 (1981) (distinguishing "inclusionary" measures from
"anti-exclusionary" measures). The court focused specifically on "incentive
zoning" and "mandatory set-asides." See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 445-48.
"Incentive zoning" refers to the practice of providing a bonus in the form of
increased density permits as the amount of lower income housing increases.
See id. at 445. "Mandatory set-asides" simply require that a certain proportion of a development be set aside for low and moderate income housing. See
id. at 446. See generally Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning for All: Using Inclusionary Zoning Techniques to Promote Affordable Housing, 44
EMORY L.J. 359, 369-84 (1995) (examining a range of inclusionary zoning
techniques that have been employed by state and local governments). Alternative inclusionary techniques include zoning appeals legislation, which
eradicates the presumption of validity for zoning actions that impede the
provision of affordable housing, see id. at 370-72, and adoption of comprehensive land use plans at the state level, see Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for ExclusionaryZoning, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1127, 1143
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ture responded to these decisions by enacting the Fair Housing
Act of 1985,06 creating a state agency to oversee
municipal im07
plementation of the Mt. Laurel principles.1
Under the Fair Housing Act, the difficulties of imposing
fair-share obligations on every city are mitigated through Regional Contribution Agreements (RCAs), in which municipalities
can transfer a portion of its share of fair housing to another
municipality. 10 RCAs were intended to minimize the likelihood that middle-class whites hoping to move out of the city
would take advantage of the program to the detriment of poor
minorities. 10 9 Unfortunately, these initiatives have had little
success in enabling urban poor and minority
populations to obtain
110
the benefits of living in the suburbs.
The Mt. Laurel decisions and subsequent legislation were
driven by a recognition that exclusionary zoning perpetuates
racial and socioeconomic segregation and thereby isolates minorities from opportunity structures, including education and

(1995) (arguing that state level planning permits more effective remediation
for the lack of low-income housing because it permits planners to accommodate concerns for transportation and job development). This latter type of inclusionary zoning plan best comports with the rationale underlying utilization
of state-constitutional education clauses to provide more integrated education
through alteration of residential segregation patterns. See infra Part IIA
(setting forth remedial framework flowing from the logic of adequacy suits).
106. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.27D.301-.328 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997).
The Act required each "municipality to adopt and implement a housing plan
that would address [its] fair share of the unmet regional need for" affordable
housing. WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 94, at 5. The Act created a state
agency, the New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, authorized to determine fair-share obligations. See id.
107. Initial reactions to Mt. Laurel II were negative. The governor referred to the holdings as "communistic." See CALLIES, supra note 94, at 452.
Although proponents of Mt. Laurel II criticized the act for abandoning "goals
of economic and racial deconcentration," id. (quoting Fox, The Selling Out of
Mt. Laurel: Regional Contribution Agreements in New Jersey's FairHousing
Act, 16 FORD. URB. L.J. 535, 572 (1988)), the court upheld the act, see Hills
Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
108. See Ford, supra note 17, at 1899-1900 (discussing operation of Fair
Housing Act).
109. See id. at 1900-01 (explaining rationale underlying implementation of
RCAs).
110. See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 94, at 68-74 (reaching conclusion
from empirical survey of Mt. Laurel program participants); see also CHARLES M.
HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SEIGE: RACE, SPACE AND AuDAcious JUDGES 167-69
(1996) (criticizing the Mt. Laurel decisions for skirting the issue of racial isolation
and noting that avoidance of this issue was predicated on avoiding federal judicial review).
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employment."1 According to data collected by New Jersey's Affordable Housing Management Service, however, urban fair-share
units remain predominantly minority, whereas suburban units
Commentators suggest that subtle
remain largely white.'
discrimination, relative impoverishment, and relative lack of
choice explain these disparities." 3
B. AcIfIEVING EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY THROUGH
RESIDENTIAL INTEGRATION

In contrast to Mt. Laurel, housing initiatives stemming
from the case of Hills v. Gautreaux1" have been highly successful for minority populations. In the Gautreaux case, the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court finding that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development had aided and
abetted racial segregation in the Chicago Housing Authority." 5
The decision was followed by a settlement which provided Section 8 certificates for use by black public housing residents in
relocating to urban and suburban areas with black populations
under 30%.116 Studies have shown that the households that
moved into predominantly white, middle-income suburbs1 7have
enjoyed dramatic benefits in employment and education.
111. See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 94, at 14-18 (providing context for
Mt. Laurelinitiatives).
112. See id. at 70-74.
113. See id. at 72-76. For example, the state agency overseeing fair-share
programs may set prices as high as 50% of median income, a prohibitive cost
for many urban minorities. See id. at 72; see also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (observing that severe racial and socioeconomic isolation
places severe internal limitations on mobility).
114. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
115. See id. at 286-91. For an overview of the social movements underlying the practice of and legal rationale for exclusionary zoning, see Keith Aoki,
Race, Space, and Place:The Relation Between ArchitecturalModernism, PostModernism, Urban Planning,and Gentrification,20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699,
757-64 (1993).
116. See Gautreaux v. Landrieu, 523 F. Supp. 665, 672-83 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(approving the settlement of claims by consent decree), affd, 690 F.2d 616
(7th Cir. 1982).
117. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 26, at 1553-54 (providing findings
from Northwestern University study of Gautreaux participants); see also
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 231 (discussing the benefits of integration afforded by Gautreaux and other housing mobility programs); Florence
Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and
Means of PromotingResidentialRacial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REv. 479, 50611 (1995) (book review) (comparing Massey and Denton's cost-benefit analysis
of the Gatreaux programs with those of other researchers). But see Richard
H. Sander, Book Review, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 143, 150 (1994) (reviewing
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Professor Rosenbaum's study of Gautreaux participants
"strongly suggests that poor educational and vocational skills
and opportunities are neighborhood-determined and can be
improved when deprived people are permitted to move to better-served neighborhoods."' 18 Urban to suburban movement
permitted under Gautreaux's race-conscious, metropolitanwide program has also yielded salutary results in terms of minority educational achievement.'1 9 Empirical and anecdotal
evidence demonstrates that low-income minority children who
moved to the suburbs were more likely to be in school, in collegetrack courses, attend college, obtain quality employment, and
experience increased social integration than their urban counterparts. 2 ' Salient characteristics explaining the success of
the Gautreaux project include provision of housing counseling
to explain the advantages and disadvantages of program participation and utilization of Section 8 housing certificates to
circumvent barriers to mobility, such as discrimination and
housing costs.' 2 ' Despite the implementation of a metropolitan-wide remedial plan, levels of segregation in Chicago remain high.'22 The lack of large-scale impact can be explained,
however, by the limited number of participants, numbering
only 4500 from 1976 to 1993.123
(contending that the benefits derived from the Gautreaux
program are actually quite modest). For a bibliography of the vast literature
on the Gautreaux program, see Roisman, supra at 507 n.140.
118. Roisman, supra note 117, at 508 (discussing Rosenbaum et al., supra
note 26, at 1553); see RUSH, supra note 19, at 121 (noting the success of the
Gautreauxprogram undermines arguments that minority failure stems from a
'culture of poverty'). Other studies also support the common-sense hypothesis
that movement to better neighborhoods increases employment opportunities.
See Roisman, supra note 117, at 508-09 nn.147-48 (citing George E. Peterson
AMERICAN APARTHEID)

& Kale Williams, Housing Mobility: What Has It Accomplished and What Is
Its Promise?, in HOUSING MOBILITY: PROMISE OR ILLUSION 7, 12-13

(Alexander Polikoff ed., 1995)).
119. See James E. Rosenbaum et al., White Suburban Schools'Responses to
Low-Income Black Children: Sources of Successes and Problems, 20 URBAN
REV. 28, 39-40 (1988) (discussing the impact of residential integration on educational achievement).
120. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 26, at 1552-53 (drawing conclusions
from quasi-empirical survey of Gautreaux participants).
121. See WISH & EISDORFER, supra note 94, at 72-73 (comparing success of
Gautreaux project with that of Mt. Laurel). Federal Section 8 certificates
subsidize rental of private-sector apartments. See Rosenbaum et al., supra
note 26, at 1522 n.20.
122. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 19, at 224-25 (discussing the failure of Gautreaux remedies to significantly reduce high levels of residential
segregation).
123. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 26, at 1521-24 (explaining operation
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Reliance on Gautreaux-type strategies in other metropolitan areas is limited by the narrow criteria necessary to trigger
remedial action under federal law.124 Without a showing of intentional discrimination, the federal courts are unable to fashion relief for even the most devastating segregation. The continuing failure to realize the promise of Brown in Northern
cities 2 ' provides an impetus for exploring state-constitutional
alternatives to federal anti-discrimination law, making Sheff
an ideal case for development of a broader remedial framework.
C. SHEFFV. O'NELL: THE REQUIREMENT OF AN "EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY"

1. The Affirmative Duty to Eradicate Segregation
In Sheff v. O'Neill,'26 the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted that state's constitution to require access to an unsegregated educational environment. 27 The plaintiffs, Hartford schoolchildren, introduced evidence of "severe educational
disadvantages arising out of their racial and ethnic isolation
and their socioeconomic deprivation."'28 Responding only to
the former claim, the court concluded that the existence of extreme racial and ethnic isolation in the public schools deprives
schoolchildren of "a substantially equal educational opportunity," thereby requiring the state to take remedial action.'29
of Gautreaux program).
124. See Sander, supra note 30, at 921 (discussing potential for raceconscious desegregation strategies under federal law); supra text accompanying
note 115 (stating the ruling in Gautreaux).
125. See supra note 19 (discussing persistence of hypersegregation in
Northern cities).
126. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
127. See id. at 1288. The court relied on the confluence of the state constitution's education and equal protection provisions. See id. at 1271; see also
supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text (explaining textual basis for decision).
128. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the
State was responsible for the de facto segregation between the Hartford and
surrounding school districts, that the State perpetuated that segregation, that
the State failed to provide the plaintiffs with an equal educational opportunity
in comparison with surrounding school districts, and that the State failed to
provide plaintiffs with a minimally adequate education, all in contravention of
the state constitution. See id; see also supra note 4 (providing demographic
overview of Hartford school system).
129. See id. at 1280-81. Though the court recognized that plaintiffs labored under the "dual burden" of poverty and racial segregation, it ruled that
because poverty is not a suspect classification the plaintiffs claim did not
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The court determined that the constitution imposes a duty
upon the state to remedy educational deficiencies resulting
from segregated conditions, even the though these conditions
"neither were caused nor are perpetuated by invidious intentional conduct on the part of the state."130 In reaching this
holding, the court first observed that the education clause imposes
an affirmative obligation on the state to provide a public education. 131 This fundamental right is augmented by Connecticut's unique equal protection clause, which expressly proscribes "subject[ion] to segregation." 132
The court then
determined that in the important context of public education,

implicate constitutional questions. See id. at 1287-88.
130. Id. at 1282. Reading the education clause as informed by the antisegregation clause, the court determined that extreme racial and ethnic isolation required the state to take remedial action. See id. at 1281. The court
acknowledged "as a matter of federal constitutional law, that claimants seeking judicial relief for educational disparities pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution must
prove intentional governmental discrimination against a suspect class." Id. at
1278-79. However, the Connecticut court also observed that the Federal Supreme Court decisions were largely informed by principles of federalism, see
id. at 1279 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44
(1973)), as well as by the determination that no fundamental right to an education exists under the U.S. Constitution, see id (citing 411 U.S. at 35). Neither of
these strictures limited the Connecticut court, which analyzed the alleged infringement under strict scrutiny. See id. at 1286-87. See generally powell,
supra note 14, at 758 (noting that federal intent standards do not bind state
courts or policymakers).
131. The education clause of the Connecticut Constitution places an affirmative obligation on the state to provide "free public elementary and secondary schools." CONN. CONST. art. VIII, §1. In Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359
(Conn. 1977), the court had determined that the state's failure to adequately
address school funding inequalities offended the fmdamental right to a substantially equal educational opportunity stemming from this provision. See
id. at 374. The defendants in Sheff urged that by "substantially equaliz[ing]
school funding and resources," the state had fully satisfied its constitutional
obligations. 678 A.2d at 1281.
132. The Connecticut Constitution states: "No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination.., because of... race, [or] ancestry .... " CONN. coNST. art. I, § 20. Only
New Jersey has a comparable constitutional provision: "No person shall...
be segregated in the militia or in the public schools" because of race, religion,
or national origin. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1281-82.
Though it relied on the plain meaning of the antisegregation clause, the Connecticut court cited a Michigan case holding that state's equal protection
clause "imposed an affirmative obligation on the state to prevent [racial] discrimination" irrespective of a showing of discriminatory intent or purpose. Id.
at 1283 n.32 (citing Detroit Branch, NAACP v. Dearborn, 434 N.W.2d 444
(Mich. App. 1988), appealdenied, 447 N.W.2d 751 (1989)).
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these provisions impose upon state officials a duty to provide
an unsegregated educational environment.133
Plaintiffs also alleged that segregation deprived them of an
adequate education.'
The majority did not reach this claim,
citing the sufficiency of its holding for remedial purposes.'3 5
The concurrence would have held, however, that the fundamental right to an education presupposes an "adequate" education. 13 6 The concept of adequacy, the concurring justice determined, is inconsistent with a racially segregated learning
environment. 13 7 The concurrence thus found that severe racial
isolation deprives the plaintiffs
of both an adequate and an
138
equal educational opportunity.
2. The Scope of the Duty to Provide an Equal Educational
Opportunity
The court reasoned that two state statutes--one establishing school district parameters coextensive with town boundaries and the other requiring that children attend school in the
district where they reside-were the single most important factors in maintaining racial and ethnic disparities within the
state's school districts. 139 Failure on the part of state officials
to remedy these disparities did not differ for constitutional
purposes from an earlier failure to address funding disparities. 14° The court determined that the state had not "fully satisfied its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity" by demonstrating it

133. The debate surrounding the 1965 Constitutional Convention provided
ample support for the court's conjoined reading of the education and equal
protection clauses. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1282-83. The court noted that when
the constitution was amended to include the segregation clause in 1965, it remained unclear whether the holdinginfBrown I applied to de facto segregation and
that the clause was inserted to express unequivocal opposition to the philosophy and practice of segregation. See id. at 1283-84 & n.33-34.
134. See id. at 1271.
135. See id. at 1286.
136. See id. at 1292 (Berdon, J., concurring).
137. See id. at 1293.
138. See id. at 1292 n.2.
139. See id. at 1277-78. The court also noted that the state exerts control
over schools in many respects, including curricula, standardized testing,
graduation requirements, and attendance. See id. at 1273.
140. See id. at 1278 (citing Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn.
1977), which concerned the constitutionality of the state's education financing
scheme).
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had substantially equalized school funding and resources.1 41 In
addition, the constitution's education provision, as informed by
its equal protection clause, required affirmative state action to
remedy segregation in the states' schools. 42
Despite the cour's determination that "[i]t is crucial for a
democratic society to provide all of its schoolchildren with fair
access to an unsegregated education,"143 the court refrained
from granting equitable relief.'" Citing separation of powers
concerns, it left remedial determinations to the state legislature. 45 Nonetheless, the court admonished the legislative and
executive branches to treat the matter with urgency, concluding that "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands
judicial protection." 4 6

141. Id. at 1281.
142. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (discussing the
court's central holding).
143. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1289.
144. See id. at 1290.
145. See id. The court determined that "further judicial intervention
should be stayed 'to afford the General Assembly an opportunity to take appropriate legislative action." Id. (quoting Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d at 359);
cf Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 165-66 (Ala. 1993) (providing
highly specific guidelines directing legislative action); supra notes 51, 87
(suggesting that courts can legitimate controversial remedial action by providing specific guidance).
146. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1291 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566
(1964)). When a trial judge dismissed the case in 1995, Connecticut Governor
John Rowland celebrated. See Justice for Hartford'sSchools, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 16, 1996, at A14 (noting the Connecticut Supreme Coures decision in
Sheff). Some suburban school officials responded negatively to the Sheff
opinion. One suggested that any proposal to bus students outside a suburban
system would mean "a war on our hands." Id. Another official suggested that
the Supreme Court's encroachment on local decision making was "an attack
on the very founding principles of public education." Id. The governor
blocked a $14 million bond needed to complete a partially constructed regional
magnet school in response to the requests of a conservative state senator who
supported him on key legislation during the past year. See Meredith Carlson,
Rowland's Block of School's FundingCriticized,HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 25,
1996, at B1.
On January 22, 1997, the Educational Improvement Panel presented 15
potential remedial solutions to the state legislature in order to meet the
court's desegregation order. See Sheff Panel Recommendations, HARTFORD
COURANT, Jan. 23, 1997, at A10. Significant measures included school choice,
subsidized preschools, and tying construction money to integration goals. See
id. Both the choice and construction proposals were deemed "controversial."
See id.; see also supra note 51 (suggesting that lack of remedial guidance engenders opposition and noncompliance).
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D. THE LIMITATIONS OF SHEFF'SY"EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY": A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY
The court's treatment of racial isolation as separable from
adverse socioeconomic conditions substantially reduces the
decision's efficacy for redressing the inequities in the state's
education system. Because the court did not perceive the cyclical nature of racial and socioeconomic isolation, the decision
failed to comport with the realities of hypersegregation. 147 By
focusing exclusively on race, and failing to provide any remedial guidance, the court may have inadvertently exacerbated
racial tensions, as by raising the specter of a return to busing.
By carefully explicating the link between race and socioeconomics, the court could have provided much needed political
cover for legislative development and implementation of multidistrict remedial measures.
1. The Limited Remedial Force of"An Equal Educational
Opportunity"
Empirical research demonstrates that racial and socioeconomic isolation form mutually reinforcing and intractable impediments to educational achievement.14 8 Racial segregation
has a devastating effect on a minority student's long-term orientation to society. 149 The socioeconomic isolation attendant to
racial segregation severely limits the possibility of escaping the
150
harms of segregation, which are often multigenerational.

147. See supra notes 4 (providing demographic statistics for Hartford and
surrounding school system) & 19 (defining hypersegregation).
148. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (explaining how racial
segregation concentrates poverty).
149. Segregation visits upon students "a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.... The impact [of segregation] is greater when it
has the sanction of the law." Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Although we
now associate "force of law" with invidious discriminatory intent, the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation appeared much later. Cf. Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200-01 (1973) (holding that state-imposed
segregation in part of a school district may allow a finding of a dual system in
the entire district). Professor powell has observed that "our language and our
national consciousness about segregation have been shaped by the federal
courts." powell, supra note 14, at 757. Under state constitutions, however,
state action exists as a function of the affirmative obligations embodied in
education clauses.
See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text
(discussing the Sheff coures finding of an affirmative obligation to provide a
public education).
150. See Sheff, 678 A-2d at 1293 (Berdon, J., concurring) (noting the "generational

594

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:565

Long-term isolation from the opportunity structures of job networks, quality education, health care, and adequate housing,
and the attendant subjection to concentration effects, 1 51 thus
frustrate attempts to achieve meaningful integration, as opposed to numerical desegregation. 52 Meaningful integration
would attempt to ameliorate concentration effects by acknowledging the necessity of a comprehensive remedial program that
encompasses multiple legal categories, rather than treating
these problems as severable. 53
The Sheff majority failed to specify any appropriate relief
for racial segregation. 15 4 Instead, the court granted declaratory
relief and retained jurisdiction to grant consequential relief in
the event that legislative oversight proved ineffective. 155 While
continuing jurisdiction is an appropriate response in the context of school-financing claims, 56 several factors militate
against legislative oversight of racial integration. Virulent opposition to desegregation has historically frustrated legislative
development of remedial measures. 57 The history of federal
cycle" of segregation).
151. See supra notes 26, 32-36 and accompanying text (discussing opportunity structures and concentration effects). The term "concentration effects"
captures the fact that severe isolation along several sociological axes leads to
an exponential isolation from mainstream patterns of behavior, creating in
segments of the inner city a "social milieu significantly different from the environment that existed in these communities several decades ago." WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 26, at 58.
152. See supra note 17 (distinguishing integration from desegregation);
notes 37-38 and accompanying text (stating that interdistrict remedies alter
perceptions).
153. See infra notes 208-219 and accompanying text (providing a pragmatic justification for a broad-based remedial plan); part LI.A (offering an
outline of an effective remedial program).
154. See 678 A.2d at 1290.
155. See id. The court followed this same methodology in an earlier case
declaring the state's school financing scheme unconstitutional. See id. (citing
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977)).
156. See Horton, 376 A.2d at 375-76 (noting existence of a legislative plan
for school finance reform); see also Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 319 (Minn.
1993) (deferring to legislative judgment in allocation of financial resources).
But see Enrich, supra note 78, at 143-55 (suggesting that equality-based solutions threaten the interests of wealthy school districts, permit too much leeway in quantitative comparisons, and ultimately fail to ameliorate disparities
in achievement); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School. Finance Remedies and
State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1072, 1072-73 (1991) (arguing that legislatures fail to develop adequate remedies because property-rich districts exert
disproportionate influence over the judicial process).
157. Judicial invocation of separation of powers concerns to justify deference to legislative oversight often operates as no more than an abdication to
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desegregation jurisprudence vividly illustrates the need for
vigilance in overseeing implementation of constitutionally required remedies. The Supreme Court's vague admonition to
desegregate with "all deliberate speed" needlessly delayed, and
eventually undermined, federal desegregation efforts. 5 8
By failing to provide any remedial guidance, the Sheff
court may have in fact inadvertently undermined the force of
the decision. In reducing plaintiffs' claims to a question of racial demographics, the court implied that interdistrict busing
or alteration of district boundaries will provide effective remedial solutions. On the contrary, busing engenders significant
opposition and may exacerbate racial tensions.15 9 Alteration of
district boundaries provides an immediate, but similarly unsatisfactory, solution to the problems of segregation. 6 ° Effective remedial measures must not simply move students across district lines, but also 61address the conditions underlying
persistent segregation.'
majority preferences, which impedes the development and the implementation of constitutionally mandated remedial programs. See Johnson, supra
note 27, at 1608-09 (arguing that white attitudes and racism are major obstacles to redressing the problems of segregation); supra note 107 (noting criticism of the New Jersey court for upholding Fair Housing Act as constitutional
despite lesser degree of enforcement than mandated by the Mt. Laurel II decision); cf Unfulfilled Promises,supra note 156, at 1078 (arguing that, in the
context of school finance cases, courts that find in favor of plaintiffs are vulnerable to political influences). The reaction of Connecticut Democrats to the
possibility of "race-baiting" on issues of busing and redistricting provides a
vivid illustration of the low esteem in which these traditional remedies are
held. See Matthew Daly, Sheff Memo Stirs Capitol Tempers: GOP Cries Foul
After Discovery, HARTFORD COURANT, July 22, 1996, at Al (discussing a report
issued in response to Sheff in which Connecticut's Democratic leadership recommended that candidates take clear preemptory positions against these desegregation strategies).
158. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing opposition
to federal desegregation programs); supra notes 73, 86-87 (examining courts'
capacity to shape policy agendas by providing remedial guidance).
159. See supra note 42 (discussing limited receptivity to busing as remedy
for racial segregation).
160. See supra notes 26, 60 (noting necessity of crossing extant boundaries); infra part III.B.1 (contending that effective remedial strategies must
foster a sense of belonging).
161. Recent research indicates that educational segregation results in
long-term segregation because blacks underestimate their ability to contend
with racial tension and overestimate white resistance to integration. See Amy
Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, PerpetuationTheory and the Long-Term Effects
of School Desegregation,64 REv. EDuc. REs. 531, 533 (1994). Black students
who experience integration in public schools are more likely to attend college,
work, and live in integrated environments. See Braddock and McPartland,
supra note 41, at 8 (observing that "minority segregation tends to be perpetu-
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Normative arguments also militate in favor of remedial
guidance. Courts should not, absent an express reservation,
defer to legislative judgment regarding the proper scope of constitutional rights.'62 As a matter of institutional competency,
the Sheff court had a duty not only to determine whether the
legislature fulfilled its affirmative duties to the state's schoolchildren,16 but also to specify the state's remedial obligations."6
2. The Limited Precedential Value of "An Equal Educational
Opportunity"
Other state courts addressing claims of racial and socioeconomic segregation in violation of state obligations will undoubtedly look to Sheff as an instructive example. 6 While the
Sheff court understandably referred to the unique role that the
term "segregation" plays in the equal protection clause of the
Connecticut Constitution, 66 this aspect of the court's reasoning
needlessly detracts from Sheffs precedential value. Ascribing
ated over stages of the life cycle and across institutional settings"); see also
supra part L.A (discussing how segregation impacts access to opportunity
structures); infra part IH.B (arguing that pragmatic, political, and legal considerations justify wide-ranging remedial measures, including housing integration).
162. While educational financing decisions are clearly the province of the
legislature, it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret, construe, and give
meaning to the text of the constitution. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,
375 (Conn. 1977); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87
(Wash. 1978) (en banc).
163. See Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1276 (Conn. 1996).
164. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 145 (Ala. 1993) (stating
that "constitutional obligations [under the education clause] cannot be avoided
because of a lack of funding") (quoting McCarthy v. Manson, 554 F. Supp.
1275, 1304 (D. Conn. 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1983); Rose v. Council
for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989) ("The judiciary has the
ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words,
phrases, sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as necessitated
by the controversies before it.... This duty must be exercised even
when.., the court's view of the constitution is contrary to that of other
branches, or even that of the public."). In Rose, the court set forth binding criteria of educational adequacy, see id. at 212-13, but left funding decisions to
the discretion of the General Assembly, see id. at 216.
165. See Brief for Appellant at 23, NAACP v. State, (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(No. C9-96-2439) (suggesting that plaintiffs in NAACP v. State intend to use
Sheff as legal authority for their claim of unconstitutional racial segregation
in the Minneapolis public schools); see also Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 210 (citing a
case from another state to demonstrate that "courts may, should and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a constitutionally mandated
educational system").
166. See supra notes 126-133 and accompanying text (detailing the court's
reasoning).
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independent significance to this term was not necessary to the
holding that de facto segregation offends the fundamental right
to an education.16 In other cases, the term "efficient" alone, or
in combination with "thorough," has been held to impose an affirmative duty to provide a minimally adequate education to all
students. 6 The concurrence extended this logic to embrace integration as a component of adequacy. 169 In addition to these
textual bases for adoption of an adequacy rationale, other legal
and policy considerations support the use of adequacy for redressing
claims of racial and socioeconomic segregation.
The original scope of Brown v. Board of Education170 did
not contemplate a distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. 7 1 Rather, the Court recognized that segregated
schools were inherently unequal and that racial isolation posed
a barrier to educational achievement that was exacerbated by
government imprimatur. 1 2 The later distinction between de
facto and de jure segregation13 is irrelevant under stateconstitutional fundamental rights analysis. While the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize education as a fundamental
right limited the scope of judicial relief in segregation cases, 7 4
fundamental rights analysis allows state courts to depart from
75
the federal intent standard.
Courts, including the Sheff majority, have also relied on
policy grounds to support integrated schools. 76 These decisions
167. See Sheff, 678 A-2d at 1292 n.2 (noting that adequacy provides a separate
constitutional ground for remedying segregation); cf. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215
(establishing specific standards of adequacy solely on the basis of the education clause).
168. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (explaining textual basis of adequacy suits); supra note 85 (observing that fundamental notions of
fairness may inform adequacy decisions as much as text).
169. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text (detailing the reasoning of the concurring opinion).
170. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
171. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1284 n.37 (observing that when the state's constitution was amended to include the segregation clause, it was unclear
whether Brown I was limited to de jure segregation); see also notes 43-48 and
accompanying text (reviewing basis of the Brown I decision).
172. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-96.
173. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (distinguishing de facto
and dejure segregation).
174, See supra notes 23 and 57 (discussing effect of Rodriguez decision on
desegregation cases).
175. See supra notes 130-131 (discussing fundamental rights analysis under state law).
176. Citing to language in Brown I, the Sheff court stated that education is a 'a
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underscore the importance of education by citing its capacity to
inculcate values and shape the future economic welfare of society. For example, the Supreme Court recognized that denial of
a common education jeopardizes the inculcation of shared values
necessary to a democratic political system. 1 7 Alternately, a
New Jersey opinion highlighted the impact 178of educational
quality on that state's future economic welfare.
That the Sheff court's reliance on Connecticut's unique
equal protection clause detracts from the holding's precedential
value is well illustrated in a current case being brought by the
NAACP against the State of Minnesota. 179 In that case, plaintiff class brought suit alleging that racially and socioeconomically segregated conditions perpetuated by the state violate the
180
students' fundamental right to an adequate education.
Whereas the Sheff court predicated its analysis on a prior decision identifying a fundamental right to an "equal educational
opportunity," 1 ' the Minnesota plaintiffs based their claim on
an earlier decision conferring a fundamental right to a

principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, [and] in preparing him for later professional training.'" Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1289 (quoting
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493). The court further stated that "[i]f children of different races and economic and social groups have no opportunity to know each
other and to live together in school, they cannot be expected to gain the understanding and mutual respect necessary for the cohesion of our society." Id.
at 1285 (quoting Jenkins v. Township of Morris Sch. Dist., 279 A.2d 619, 634
(N.J. 1971)). See also supra note 87 (giving public policy rationales for holding
education systems unconstitutional).
177. The Court stated that "[wie cannot ignore the significant social costs
borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the
values and skills upon which our social order rests." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 221 (1982).
178. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 411-12 (N.J. 1990). The court observed
that deprivation of a quality education affects not only the state's social fabric,
but also impacts the entirety of the state and its economic basis; the economicwell being and technical and professional acumen of the urban poor is "an integral part of our future economic strength.... So it is not just that their future depends on the State, the state's future depends on them." Id.
179. See Brief for Appellant at 22-26, NAACP v. State (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (No. C9-96-2439) (discussing the inapplicability of Sheffs analysis to a
claim brought under Minnesota's constitution). Because the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of certified questions as premature and issued an order remanding for trial, no respondent's brief was filed. See
NAACP v. State, No. C9-96-2439 (Minn. Jan 21, 1997) (order denying petition
for accelerated review for the purpose of dismissing appeal as premature).
180. Plaintiffs base their claim on the existence of districting statutes
similar to those of Connecticut.
181. See supra note 1 (detailing the plaintiffs' allegations).
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"uniform and adequate" education.18 2 Although the claim is

structurally synonymous with that in Sheff, the state argued
that the Connecticut Court's reasoning is inapposite under
Minnesota law, both because the court did not reach the adequacy issue 183 and because of its reliance on the unique equal
protection provision." The Sheff court's failure to explicitly
identify integration as a component of an adequate education
thus detracts from both its remedial and precedential force.
III. TAKING ADEQUACY SERIOUSLY: EDUCATION
CLAUSES MANDATE INTEGRATED EDUCATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTS
An alternative line of reasoning from the one adopted by
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Sheff offers a more effective
solution to the problem of persistent socioeconomic and racial
segregation. By interpreting education clauses to independently
mandate adequate and, by extension, integrated educational
environments, courts can simultaneously address isolation
from opportunity structures and subjection to concentration effects, phenomena that impede educational achievement.
Equating adequacy with integration corrects several failures of
existing desegregation jurisprudence: it does not require proof
of invidious discriminatory intent, rejects the distinction between
socioeconomic and racial segregation, and compels wideranging remedial measures. By combining salutary features of
existing integration strategies, educational adequacy can serve as
a catalyst for achieving meaningful integration. As the discussion below demonstrates, legal, political, and pragmatic
considerations justify this approach, despite its controversial
implications.
A. EDUCATION CLAUSES INDEPENDENTLY MANDATE ADEQUATE
AND, BY EXTENSION, INTEGRATED SCHOOLS

The concurring opinion in Sheff reasoned that the fundamental right to an education confers a correlative right to an
adequate education. 185 This comports with other decisions that
182. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 311 (Minn. 1993).
183. See supra note 1 (noting that the Sheff court didn't reach merits of
adequacy claim).
184. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text (discussing substance
and history of the provision).
185. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text (discussing concur-
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have employed adequacy theories to redress disparities in education financing.'86 The Sheff concurrence additionally asserted,
however, that adequacy entails not only threshold standards of
educational quality, but also presupposes integrated educational
facilities. 8 ' Reliance on this theory would have resolved the
tension between the Sheff court's
holding and the lived reality
88
of Hartford schoolchildren.
Even if current school districts were fully integrated, statistical segregation would remain high.'8 9 Only movement
across extant boundaries can significantly reduce present levels of isolation.'9 ° Recognizing integration as a component of
adequacy comports with empirical analysis demonstrating that
spatial isolation by race and class forms an insurmountable
barrier to educational achievement.' 9' Because education
clauses impose an affirmative obligation on states to act,
rather than refrain from acting, absence of discriminatory intent fails as a defense to segregation.'9 2 As the Sheff court
noted, this affirmative duty entails more than a legislative
scheme that furthers an
important nonracial interest, such as
93
local control of schools.
Once integration is identified as a component of adequacy,
general welfare considerations compel courts to mandate Mt.
Laurel-type remedies. 94 Since educational adequacy precedes
economic welfare and enhances students' capacity for exercising
the duties of citizenship, 95 states have a responsibility to enring opinion).
186. See supra part I.C (exploring education clause litigation).
187. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1294 (Berdon, J. concurring) ("Education entails
not only the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic, but also includes the
development of social understanding and racial tolerance.").
188. See supra notes 128-129, 160-161 and accompanying text (noting the
court's decision to treat racial and socioeconomic isolation as separable).
189. See supra note 25 (explaining the protracted nature of segregation in
urban schools).
190. See Rivkin, supra note 18, at 285 (suggesting that because of extreme
isolation, only movement across existing boundaries through busing or housing remedies will produce desegregation); see also Orfield, supra note 36, at
826 n.12 (noting that in 1993 only 10.9% of black students and 5.1% of Latino
students attended nonmetropolitan public schools).
191. See supra note 37 (noting strong correlation between racial segregation and poor quality schools).
192. See supra notes 57-60, 64-67 and accompanying text (noting that federal intent standard effectively precluded relief for segregation).
193. See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1288.
194. See supra part II.A (discussing Mt. Laurel initiatives).
195. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (recognizing these in-
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sure that each student has access to an integrated educational
environment.196 Although busing and redistricting achieve efficient numerical desegregation, 197 only alteration of segregated
residence patterns confer a sense of membership in the larger
community. 98 Combining the salutary features of Mt. Laurel,
99
Gautreaux, and the more traditional desegregation cases
0
The three prongs of incluyields a more effective solution.
sionary zoning, private-market subsidies, and county-wide
demographic redistribution while
school districts maximize
20 1
minimizing costs.
Although Mt. Laurel's initiatives have failed to benefit minority populations, 0 2 inclusionary zoning is necessary to ensure20a3
minimum supply of affordable housing throughout a region.
As the Mt. Laurel H decision indicated, without the use of specific inclusionary techniques, municipalities are unlikely to
adopt appropriate zoning ordinance amendments. 2°4 While inclusionary techniques ensure a minimum store of affordable
housing, the Mt. Laurel experience shows that predicating the
right to fair housing on a wealth classification alienates the
minority population that constitutes the real victim of residential
segregation.2 ' Although the New Jersey court avoided federal
terests as informing adequacy decisions); infra notes 207-217 and accompanying text (suggesting that capacity of integrated education to foster community
justifies housing remedies).
196. See supra notes 134-138 (noting that integration is a logical extension
of fundamental right to adequate education). Imposing this responsibility on
the state comports with interpretive theories suggesting that courts should
expansively interpret constitutionally protected public interests. See supra
note 88.
197. See supra note 42 (discussing pros and cons of busing).
198. See supra notes 38, 177-178 (noting that a fundamental role of education is to promote economic welfare and common values).
199. See supra part HA & B (discussing remedial programs employed as a
result of these decisions).
200. Redistricting links cities to suburbs, which is a necessary condition to
stemming white-flight away from minority school districts. See RuSK, supra
note 19, at 34-38.
201. See supra notes 25, 60 (noting that only redistribution can alleviate
the problems of segregation).
202. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of Mt. Laurel initiatives and offering explanations).
203. See Mt. Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390, 445 (N.J. 1983) (permitting lower
courts to require inclusionary zoning to ensure incorporation of fair-share
housing into local planning schemes).
204 See id. at 444-45.
205. See Abigail T. Baker, Book Note, Suburbs Under Seige: Race, Space
and Audacious Judges, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100-03 (1996) (reviewing
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review on equal protection grounds, it also undermined the efficacy of its decisions. Invocation of education clauses as an
independent constitutional basis for remedial action, however,
also circumvents the problem of potential federal overruling.
The second two remedial prongs concern the issue of
population redistribution. States should implement programs
analogous to the Section 8 subsidies employed in Gautreaux,
thereby affording access to better-served communities despite
cost barriers. 20 6 Finally, redistricting, or de-districting, provides an effective mechanism for stemming the flow of the
middle-class to far flung suburban communities, while also
assisting in the goal of achieving meaningful integration,
rather than numerical desegregation.0 7
B. PRAGMATIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
JUSTIFY COURT-IMPOSED HOUSING REMEDIES

1. Pragmatic and Political Justifications
The pragmatic justification for housing remedies relies on
complementary empirical and policy justifications. Quantitative analysis demonstrates that integrated learning environments improve scores for both white and minority students.0 8
The achievement gap between these groups, moreover, decreases in integrated settings. 20 9 Increased funding associated
210
with desegregation programs does not explain this result.
Rather, segregation by race and socioeconomic status nega-

HAAR, supra note 110 ) (discussing Professor Haar's argument that Mt. Laurel
did not pay enough attention to racial issues).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 116 and 121 (explaining operation
of Section 8 program).
207. See RUSK, supra note 19, at 34-38 (discussing the relation to metrowide school systems to integrated communities).
208. See supra Part IA (noting effect of integrated schools on test scores).
209. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (citing research on
achievement in integrated schools).
210. See powell, supra note 14, at 790 (noting that even where greater
funding is allocated to segregated schools, achievement declines). The failure
of Connecticut's previous attempts to address poor achievement levels in the
Hartford schools through equalized funding supports this contention. See also
Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1294 (Conn. 1996) (discussing low levels of
academic achievement in Hartford public schools, including a 94% rate of failure to meet the state's mathematics standards among sixth graders); supra
notes 40-42 (suggesting that integration is more effective than monetary solutions for raising minority test scores).
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tively affects expectations and "communicates to students in both
subtle and explicit ways the lower standards in their schools."2 11
Policy considerations reinforce these empirical arguments.
As the Alabama court recognized, the quality of education
provided to a state's children directly impacts that state's attractiveness to business and industry.212 Integration also fosters a sense of belonging and increases the feeling of connection with the larger community.213
Capacities developed
through experience in the social environment, including
schools, act as an unconscious influence on the formation of
character.214 In this sense, an adequate education is one that
inculcates in students "social understanding and racial tolerance."21' Integrated education is thus based on the commonsense hypothesis that interaction will transform race relations
216
and yield a more fully functioning participatory democracy.
This hypothesis is supported by research showing not only that
integrated learning environments improve academic performance, but also foster long-term integration in residential and
211. powell, supra note 14, at 790.
212. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 126-27 (Ala. 1993)
(discussing testimony of business leaders concerning importance of education); supra Part LA (discussing correlation between education and long-term
benefits). The relation of adequacy requirements to opportunity structures
appears clearly in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989). The coures emphasis on the "equal opportunity to have an adequate education," id. at 211, coupled with its definition of "adequacy" as requiring at a minimum one of its goals being to provide "sufficient training or
preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as
to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently... [and] to
compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states," id. at 212,
indicates that segregation, to the extent that it acts as a barrier to "sufficient
training," renders education inadequate.
213. See powell, supra note 14, at 792; see also KENNETH L. KARST,
BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 13
(1989) (discussing the meaning of belonging in American society).
214. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 139 (1916) (discussing
the educational value of experience).
215. Sheff v. ONeill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1294 (Conn. 1996) (Berdon, J., con-

curring).
216. See Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1687 (1990) (describing the democratic theory of John

Dewey as based on the hypothesis that focusing efforts to fully develop social
intelligence on the underprivileged will yield a society more capable of resolving social problems). The transformative capacity of integrated educational
settings lessens concerns that desegregation merely means assimilation by
minorities into the dominant culture. See powell, supra note 14, at 774-78
(discussing the distinction between assimilation and integration as a transformative goal).
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employment settings.1 7 In order to receive an education adequate to an increasingly plural society,21 8 children must be
educated in a nonsegregated environment.2 19
Political considerations also justify court imposition of remedial solutions. Because housing remedies defy traditional
notions of local control over schools and challenge vested interests, courts need to provide political cover for legislative implementation of remedial programs. 22° Failure to provide spe221
cific guidance invites noncompliance and prolonged litigation.
As the Kentucky experience demonstrates, adequacy suits provide a window of opportunity for altering perceptions
concern222
ing the common interest in educational adequacy.
2. State-Constitutional Education Clauses Mandate
Imposition of Housing Remedies
Housing remedies are not discretionary, but compelled.223
That is, education clauses impose duties on the state that are
217. See Orfield, supra note 36, at 868-69 (attributing changes in attitudes
toward schools to participation in the larger community); Braddock &
McPartland, supra note 41 (providing an overview of research on positive
long-term academic and social consequences of desegregation). But cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 2061 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("It never
ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything
that is predominantly black must be inferior."). Justice Thomas failed to distinguish between innate and descriptive inferiority. The inadequacy of segregated educational facilities is not innate, but rather a function of our national
legacy of slavery and racism.
218. See sources cited supra notes 85 and 87 (arguing that unless interpreted to address current realities, constitutional rights will atrophy).
219. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1293 (Berdon, J., concurring).
220. See supra notes 86-87 (noting effectiveness of this strategy in Kentucky case).
221. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text (suggesting likelihood
of this result in Connecticut). New Jersey's experience with school finance
reform provides an instructive example of these shortcomings. Since the New
Jersey Supreme Court first decided in 1973 that its system of school financing
violated the state's education clause, the state has experienced a protracted
history of judicial pronouncement and legislative resistance. See generally
Nicolas S. Warner, Note & Comment: Toward Parity in Education:Abbott v.
Burke and the Future of New Jersey School Systems, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 183, 186-95 (1996) (giving a history of the New Jersey decisions
and accompanying legislation).
222. See supra notes 75, 86-87 (referring to Kentucky example to contend
that courts should shape legislative agenda by reference to expansive constitutional interpretation).
223. Cf. HAAR, supra note 110, at 177-78 (arguing for judicial intervention
where other branches, due either to malfeasance, pressure, or nonfeasance,
fail to uphold affirmative constitutional obligations); Unfulfilled Promises,su-
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structurally synonymous with those of the general welfare
clause. In each instance, alteration of extant housing patterns
are a necessary condition precedent to satisfaction of the textual obligation.
Because negative externalities associated with spatial
isolation by race cannot be eradicated without residential integration, such integration serves as a precondition to educational adequacy.2 24 The centrality of education to a democratic
scheme of government, as represented in the uniquely affirmative nature of education clauses, underscores the correlation between educational access and long-term access to opportunity structures. Just as exclusionary zoning implicates the
general welfare clause of state constitutions, districting statutes defining attendance on the basis of residency have the
foreseeable consequence of restricting minority populations to
segregated schools, thereby fostering long-term racial and economic segregation.2 5
While courts in states other than New Jersey have been
unwilling to undertake general welfare analysis in order to
mandate inclusionary zoning policies, education clauses provide a
structurally parallel alternative for ameliorating the inequities of
spatial segregation by race and socioeconomic status. By altering
extant boundaries that have the foreseeable effect of perpetuating
segregated conditions, adequacy theory achieves the goals of the
Mt. Laurel courts226 while simultaneously adhering to the mandate
of providing a meaningfully adequate educational opportunity.
C. APPLYING ADEQUACY REASONING To HYPERSEGREGATED
COMMUNITIES

The Sheff majority failed to reach the merits of plaintiffs'
adequacy claim because they deemed it unnecessary for resolution of the case. The court should have recognized, however,
that the education clause confers a correlative right to an adepra note 156, at 1092 (concluding that courts abdicate from constitutional duties when they defer to legislative judgment regarding the meaning of education clauses).
224. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (suggesting that the intractable nature of racialized poverty precludes educational achievement absent meaningful remedial action).
225. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (stating that districting statutes were the single most important factor in causing persistent segregation
in Hartford).
226. See supra part IIA (discussing scope of general welfare constraints on
state action).
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quate education. Empirical evidence suggests that integration
is a precondition to attainment of an adequate education, both
in terms of promoting academic achievement and of fostering of
racial tolerance. By defining threshold standards of adequacy
to include integrated educational environments, the court
would have given substance to the fundamental right embodied
in the constitution's education clause and developed a remedial
framework capable of redressing hypersegregation in Hartford's schools.
Hartford's schools remain overwhelmingly minority, while
those in surrounding communities remain overwhelmingly
white. Only movement across extant boundaries can redress
these disparities. The state of Connecticut has the highest
teacher
salaries in the nation and the best student-teacher ratio. 2 7 Nonetheless, the students of Hartford continue to be
denied an adequate education. Although state officials have
recognized the inequalities present in the state's system, the
legislature has failed to respond effectively. 2 8 Connecticut's
unique segregation provision underscores the inherent inequality of segregated educational experiences. The Sheff court's
reliance on this language, however, detracted from the precedential and remedial force of the decision. Future courts
should instead interpret the affirmative obligation to provide
an adequate and, by extension, integrated education in light of
general welfare considerations. This will allow courts to generate and enforce wide-ranging remedial measures.
CONCLUSION
Forty years after Brown, racial segregation persists as a
significant impediment to minority achievement in urban
Northern schools. Extreme spatial isolation by race and socioeconomic status has resisted increasingly limited federal desegregation efforts and continues to foreclose minority access to opportunity structures. While housing remedies have in some
instances successfully reduced barriers to educational achievement, no court has attempted to redress educational segregation
through residential integration.

227. See Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1295 n.7 (Conn. 1996) (Berdon, J.,
concurring) (quoting the trial court's findings of fact).
228. See id. (noting that previous desegregation plans have not contained
any compliance mechanisms); see also supra notes 6, 146 and accompanying

text (listing limited proposals for compliance with the Sheff ruling).
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In holding that failure to eradicate racial segregation violates the state's affirmative obligation to provide an equal educational opportunity, the Connecticut Supreme Court reaffirmed
the notion that segregated educational environments are inherently unequal. The Sheff court's recognition that race and poverty intersect to produce systematic exclusion from opportunity
structures provided a necessary first step toward educational
adequacy. The court failed, however, to develop an analytical
framework capable of compelling remedial solutions. Although
future courts faced with segregation suits will undoubtedly look
to Sheff as an instructive example, the majority's failure to address segregation in terms of adequacy undermines the remedial
and precedential value of the decision.
This Note proposes an alternative line of reasoning that recognizes integrated communities as a precondition to educational
adequacy. State courts should follow existing precedent in construing education clauses to impose a threshold standard of adequacy. Identifying integration as a basic component of adequacy
comports with an understanding of education as integral to the
instillation of common values and goals. Moreover, because of
the strong correlation between residential and educational segregation, adequacy arguments justify housing remedies as an effective means of producing adequate schools. In order to achieve
meaningful integration, states need to move beyond remedies
that exacerbate racial tensions and engender protracted opposition, and toward a conception of education predicated not only on
the rhetoric, but the reality, of our common destiny.

